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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The Utah Association for Justice (formerly the "Utah Trial Lawyers Association") 
is a statewide organization comprised of attorneys who are committed to protecting the 
rights of persons who have been injured in their person or property, and who turn to the 
courts for judicial redress. In promoting these interests, the Utah Association for Justice 
("UAJ") is particularly committed to ensuring that the judicial system provides fair, 
prompt, and efficient administration of justice. 
UAJ members represent injured people in the vast majority of personal injury tort 
actions in this state. The Court's decision on whether expert reports are required of 
treating physicians will impact virtually every one of those actions, as well as all future 
personal injury litigation. Thus, the resolution of this case will not only have a 
significant impact on the parties to this action, but upon thousands of tort victims 
throughout the State of Utah as well. 
INTRODUCTION 
The issue before the court is whether treating physicians, who have been 
designated as expert witnesses pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A) must also submit a 
written expert report, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B), even if they were not 
specially retained for the purpose of litigation, and do not testify for the party as a regular 
part of their employment. This issue of first impression for Utah can best be resolved by 
looking to the plain language of the rule itself, which excludes treating physicians and 
other non-retained experts from the written report requirement. 
iv 
Additionally, though an issue of first impression in state court, federal courts have 
been struggling with the issue since the amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 in 1993: 
When an expert, who will testify, was not hired in anticipation of litigation, 
federal courts have split on how the regulations are to be applied. It is 
agreed that the party who will call the expert must reveal the latter's 
identity, but the issue is whether the expert must file a report even when she 
will provide some opinion testimony. 
Jack H. Friedenthal, et al.9 Civil Procedure §7.6 at 403 (3d ed. 1999). The "split" in the 
federal courts has resulted in two approaches: First, the "status-based" test, based on the 
plain language of the rule, considers whether or not the witness was "retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The second is the 
"substance-based" approach that requires courts and litigants to go beyond the text of the 
rule in an attempt to define the parameters of appropriate testimony. Several key 
decisions from courts applying both approaches reveal that the status-based approach is 
consistent with the rule's plain language and promotes economy and judicial efficiency as 
well. 
UAJ contends that Utah should adhere to the general rule of construction and defer 
to the rule's plain language to determine its application. In this case, the plain language 
of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) excludes treating physicians from the written report requirement. 
Additionally, multiple policy factors, including securing "the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination"1 of every action, are promoted by a plain language 
interpretation and adherence to the status-based approach. 
1
 Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a) (2009). 
v 
ARGUMENT 
L LAW AND POLICY SUPPORT ADHERENCE TO THE "STATUS-
BASED" APPROACH RATHER THAN ADOPTION OF THE 
"SUBSTANCE-BASED" APPROACH. 
A. The Plain Language of Rule 26 Requires a "Status-based" 
Approach. 
A general rule of construction is when interpreting a rule or statute, courts should 
first look to the plain language of the provision. As this Court has explained, "[o]ur 
objective in interpreting a court rule is to give effect to the intent of the body that 
promulgated it. Thus, we interpret a court rule in accordance with its plain meaning, and 
we construe the rule so that it is in harmony with related rules." State v. Rothlisberger, 
2006 UT 49,115, 147 P.3d 1176 (footnotes omitted). 
The Utah State Constitution empowers the judiciary to "adopt rules of procedure 
and evidence to be used in the courts of the state." Utah Const. Art VIII, § 4 (1896).2 
Accordingly, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 26, were implemented by 
this Court, operating pursuant to its express constitutional authority. By interpreting the 
language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B), the Court will explicate the judiciary's intentions for 
adoption of the rule. If the Court is convinced that a change is necessary, the proper 
course of action is not to adopt an extra-textual interpretation of the existing rule, but 
2
 See also Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, \ 15 n.3, 133 P.3d 370 (noting that this 
section "vests in the Utah Supreme Court both the authority and the duty to 'adopt rules 
of procedure and evidence to be used in the courts of the state,"' and that the Legislature 
has "only the authority to 'amend the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature.'") 
rather, to amend the rule pursuant to Chapter 2, Article 2 of the Utah Judicial Council 
Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Accordingly, in addressing the issue of whether Rule 26(a)(3)(B) requires treating 
physicians to provide written expert reports, it is necessary to examine the text itself. In 
this case, the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 26 establishes the Court's intent to 
adopt a status-based approach to the rule's expert report requirement. The rule states, in 
pertinent part: 
(a)(3) Disclosure of expert testimony. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person 
who may be used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(a)(3)(B) Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or ordered by the court, 
this disclosure shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially 
employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be 
accompanied by a written report prepared and signed by the witness or party. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (2009) (emphasis added). 
The rule is drafted in an exclusive manner, with language plainly indicating that 
written reports are required of some experts, but not others. Specifically, written reports 
are only required of witnesses designated as experts pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A), and 
"retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties 
as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony." Id. 
The plain language of the rule requires consideration of the witness' status, Le.9 
whether the witness was "retained or specially employed," but not the substance of the 
witness' testimony. Indeed, any consideration of testimonial substance adds extra-textual 
2 
requirements to the rule. Clearly, according to the rule's plain language, unless a treating 
physician has also been "retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony," or 
is "an employee of the party" whose employment "regularly involve[s] giving expert 
testimony," no written report is required. General rules of construction dictate that the 
Court adhere to this status-based approach set forth by the rule's plain language. 
Additionally, courts that have deviated from the plain language of similar rules by 
adopting a substance-based approach have opened a Pandora's Box of conflicting 
policies and decisions, thereby complicating, rather than simplifying, the discovery 
process. As the following section shows, adherence to the status-based approach of the 
rule's plain language reflects proper judicial construction and sound policy as weH. 
B. Federal Jurisprudence Supports Adherence to the "Status-
based" Approach. 
As discussed above, the plain language of Rule 26 requires a status-based 
approach to the issue of whether written reports are required of an expert witness. 
Because Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s construction is a matter of first impression, it is also useful to 
consider the text and subsequent jurisprudence of its federal counterpart.3 Utah's Rule 26 
was adopted in 1999, along with several other substantive changes to the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. As reported in the Utah State Bar Journal, "[t]he rules changes were 
3
 "[S]ince the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure were fashioned after the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, we may look to decisions under the federal rules for guidance." 
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, f 64, 99 P.3d 801 (citation omitted). 
3 
originally modeled on the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."4 
Cameron S. Denning, Significant Changes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 Utah 
Bar J. 11 (1999). Regarding the changes to Rule 26, "[ejxpert reports are needed only 
from retained and testifying experts." Id. at 13 (emphasis in original). This, of course, 
was consistent with the federal rule, after which the amended state rule was patterned. 
As adopted in 1993, the amended Federal Rule 26 states, in pertinent part: 
(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony. 
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party shall 
disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial 
to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure 
shall, with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to 
provide expert testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the 
party regularly involve giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written 
report prepared and signed by the witness. 
Fed R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2) (1993). Significantly, the advisory committee explicitly 
addressed the scope of the rule pertaining to treating physicians: 
The requirement of a written report. . . applies only to those experts who are 
retained or specially employed to provide such testimony in the case or 
whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve the giving of 
such testimony. A treating physician, for example, can be deposed or called 
to testify at trial without any requirement for a written report. 
4
 The only substantial deviation from the text of the federal rule's expert 
disclosure requirements was by whom the report was to be signed. The federal rule 
requires written expert witness reports to be signed by the witness, Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(a)(2)(B) whereas the Utah Rule permits the report to be signed by ;wthe witness or 
party." Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(B); see also id. Advisory Committee Notes. 
4 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) Advisory Committee Note (1993) (emphasis added). Clearly 
the text of the federal rule—on which Utah's rule is based—as well as the advisory 
comments, contemplated a status-based approach that would permit treating physicians to 
testify without the onerous requirement of producing a written report. 
But in Wreath v. United States, 161 F.R.D. 448 (D. Kan. 1995), one federal district 
court inadvertently wrote additional requirements into the rule. In Wreath, the plaintiff 
designated her treating physician as an expert who would offer testimony on the "nature, 
extent, and cause of her damages." Id. at 449. The defense argued that this triggered 
Rule 26(a)(2)(B)'s written report requirement, and moved to compel production of a 
report. Id. The court, however, denied the motion, noting that "[e]very witness offering 
testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703 and 705 is not 'retained or specially employed to 
provide expert testimony.'" Id. at 450. 
For some reason, however, the court went further, and created an extra-textual, 
substance-based consideration about "the scope of the proposed testimony": 
To the extent that the treating physician testifies only as to the care and 
treatment of his/her patient, the physician is not to be considered a specially 
retained expert notwithstanding that the witness may offer testimony under 
Fed. R. Evid. 702, 703 and 705. However, when the physician's proposed 
opinion testimony extends beyond the facts made known to him during the 
course of care and treatment of the patient and the witness is specially 
retained to develop specific opinion testimony, he becomes subject to the 
provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). The determinative issue is the 
scope of the proposed testimony. 
Id. (emphasis added). As though the newly created, substantive component were not 
enough, the court indicated that under the new test, courts would also need to consider 
"the witness' complete name, his professional degree, the nature of the injuries for which 
5 
treatment was provided, [and] the opinion which the witness is expected to proffer" in 
determining whether or not written reports were required. See id. 
Although the court did not rely on this new test to reach its conclusion in Wreath, 
the substance-based approach was "suffered by virtue of judicial inertia to drift upon the 
surface currents of federal law." Fireside Bankv. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 98 
(Cal. App. 6 Dist. 2005) (discussing a different principle). Since then, federal courts and 
litigants have grappled with Rule 26 and the expert report requirement, and not 
surprisingly a split of authority has emerged. 
The Tenth Circuit, however, has strictly adhered to a plain language construction 
of Federal Rule 26. In Watson v. Untied States, 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007), a 
prisoner alleged that the government's neglect of his medical condition resulted in an 
incapacitating brain injury. Id. at 1102-03. At trial, the government sought to introduce 
expert testimony from the prison's clinical director, but the plaintiff objected that the 
director had not submitted a written report. Id. at 1105. The trial court overruled the 
objections, and on appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 
Quoting Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the court explained, "[wjhile the Rule focuses on those 
who must file an expert report, by exclusion it contemplates that some persons are not 
required to file reports and that these include individuals who are employed by a party 
and do not regularly give expert testimony." Id. at 1107. The court then held that 46the 
plain terms of Rule 26 [do] not include a requirement of a report in this case." Id. 
Other jurisdictions have, of course, reached different results. For instance, in 
Prieto v. Malgor, 361 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2004), the Eleventh Circuit held that an 
6 
employee expert on a police department's use of force was required to submit a written 
expert report, even though he had not been specially retained, nor did he regularly 
provide expert testimony as an employee. The court reasoned that given the scope of the 
testimony, the witness "functioned exactly as an expert witness normally does," id. at 
1319, and a report was therefore required. 
As the Federal District Court of Utah subsequently noted, however, Prieto's 
holding did not derive from the plain language of Rule 26. In Adams v. Gateway, Inc., 
2006 WL 644848 (D. Utah 2006), the court recognized that "[t]he [Prieto] opinion 
therefore held that only percipient experts are excluded from a report requirement, 
ignoring the language in the Rule." Id. at *3. Adams, a particularly well-reasoned 
decision, rejected the Eleventh Circuit's substance-based approach in favor of a plain 
language interpretation of the rule. 
In Adams, the defendant moved to compel a written expert witness report from the 
plaintiff, who had been designated as an expert on several patent issues. Id. at * 1. "The 
question," the court explained, "is whether he is bound by the requirement of Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 26(a)(2)(B) to provide an expert report." Id. The court approached the question by 
engaging in a thorough discussion of the rule's history and application, and held that 
under the plain language of the rule, the plaintiff had to be designated as a Rule 702 
expert (which he was), but he did not need to supply a report. Id. 
The court went on, however, and noted that there were "several trial level cases 
where the court has simply been unable to live with the language of the Rule." Id. at *3. 
It continued: 
7 
Generally, these cases reject the language of the Rule because 'the reading 
proposed . .. would create a distinction seemingly at odds with the evident 
purpose of promoting full pre trial disclosure of expert information." These 
cases just refuse to recognize "a category of expert trial witness for whom no 
written disclosure is required" because they say that result is "not justified by 
any articulable policy." But policy should only be used to construe a rule, 
not to contravene its language. 
Id. (quoting Day v. ConsoL Rail Corp., 1996 WL 257654 at *2 (S.B.N.Y. 1996)). The 
court concluded that cases that discard the status-based approach set forth by the rule's 
plain language "have unnecessarily stretched to find a reason that the Rule requires a 
report." Id. 
A survey of cases that have gone beyond the plain language, status-based 
approach to adopt a substance approach reveals a complicated, and often inconsistent, 
jurisprudential landscape. Some cases, like Prieto, consider what the non-retained expert 
will say, while others are concerned with when the opinion was formed. Kg, Mohney v. 
U.S.A. Hockey, Inc., 138 Fed. Appx. 804 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that because a treating 
physician's opinion was formed after treatment, rather than during, he was required to 
provide a written report). Others have held that the rule applies differently to different 
kinds of experts. See, e.g., Day v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 1996 WL 257654 (S.D.N. Y. 
1996) (finding that non-retained treating physicians may not have to file reports, but non-
retained railroad track inspectors do). 
The Tenth Circuit and District Court of Utah, however, have avoided such 
needless complication by simply adhering to the plain language of the rule and applying 
the status-based approach. Although the substance-based approach may have been 
8 
applied in more reported decisions, trends indicate that its inherent workability is 
causing it to be abandoned in favor of the status-based approach. See, e.g., Garcia v. City 
of Springfield Police Department, 230 F.R.D. 247 (D. Mass. 2005); Kirkham v. Societe 
Air France, 429 F.3d 288 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also generally Andrew W. Jurs, The 
Expert Heightened Disclosure Requirement and the Physician-Defendant in Medical 
Negligence Cases: Rejecting the Substance-Based Rule 26 Approach, 28 J. Legal Med. 
521 (2007). Now that it has been presented with the issue, the Utah Supreme Court 
should learn from other courts' mistakes, and adhere to the plain language of the rule. By 
doing so, the Court can provide clarification of Rule 26, as well as the Utah Court of 
Appeals' decision in Pete v. Youngblood. 
C. Pete v. Young blood Did Not Adopt a "Substance-based" 
Approach to Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s Written Report Requirement. 
Some practitioners and district court judges hold a misperception that Utah has 
already adopted the substance-based approach, in Pete v. Youngblood, 2006 UT App 303, 
141 P.3d 629. In that case, however, the Utah Court of Appeals simply held that pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3)(A), the plaintiff was required to identify a treating physician 
as an expert witness. Significantly, the court specifically stated that it would unot address 
5
 It cannot be disputed that there are far more reported decisions applying the 
substance-based, rather than status-based, approach. If all of the cases formed a unified, 
workable test, it might be construed as evidence of the soundness of that approach. But 
in the fifteen years since Wreath, anything but consistency has emerged. The volume of 
cases attempting to resolve some application of the substance-based approach simply 
illustrates the amount of controversy it generates, and gives an indication of the volume 
of additional motion practice involved. The economic and judicial inefficiency of the 
substance-based approach are discussed at Section 11(A), below. 
9 
whether [the treating physician] was required to file an expert report under Rule 
26(a)(3)(B). Pete, 2006 UT App at f 11, n.3. 
Despite this clear proclamation, the aforementioned misperception persists. Some 
courts, including the district court in this matter, have incorrectly relied on Pete to 
support a proposition for which the case does not stand. In this case, for instance, the 
district court held that "[t]he policy established by the Court of Appeals in the Pete case 
is clear; if a medical witness provides testimony that goes beyond mere diagnosis, 
treatment, and care of the patient, then that witness becomes a 'retained expert5 for 
purposes of Rule 26(a)(3)(A)(B)."6 To understand Pete's holding, as well as discern the 
possible source of confusion, it is useful to review the facts of the case. 
In Pete, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice case designated her treating doctor 
as a fact witness, but not as an expert. Id. at t 5. Later, the defendant moved for 
summary judgment, and in her opposition, the plaintiff presented an affidavit from her 
treating doctor that contained opinions on the applicable standard of care. Id. at f 6. On 
the defendant's motion, the trial court struck the affidavit because the treating doctor had 
not been designated as an expert. Id. 
On appeal, the court of appeals properly considered the substance of the treating 
physician's testimony to determine whether it was based solely on his observation, or 
whether it contained "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge," which would 
make him an "expert" under Utah R. Evid. 702. Id. at fflf 11-12. Because the treating 
6
 Minute Entry Re: Defendant's Motion in Limine, dated October 24, 2007 (R. 
282-284; 332-334) at 1. 
10 
doctor's opinions addressed the standard of care, the court concluded that his opinions 
were based on "specialized knowledge," and that therefore he should have been 
designated as an expert pursuant to Rule 26(a)(3)(A). Id. at ^ 14-15. As mentioned 
above, the court expressly withheld any opinion on whether Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s written 
report requirement applied. Id. at f 11 n.3. 
The district court in this case, as well in other cases pending in the district courts, 
have stretched Pete's holding to justify a "policy" that conflates the substantive 
consideration required for Rule 26(a)(3)(A)'s disclosure requirements and the written 
report requirements of Rule 26(a)(3)(B). Indeed, in this case, the district court referred 
to the rule as "26(a)(3)(A)(B)," suggesting that the court did not appreciate the 
distinction. 
But a reading of the plain language of subsections (A) and (B) reveals that their 
requirements are distinct from one another. While some measure of substantive 
consideration is necessary to categorize an expert under Rule 26(a)(3)(A), no such 
inquiry is necessary under Rule 26(a)(3)(B), which instead focuses solely on whether the 
witness has been specially retained or regularly testifies as part of his or her employment. 
Any attempt to read Pete v. Youngblood as saying something otherwise is without 
merit. Indeed, Pete itself recognizes the distinction. Discussing subsections (A) and (B), 
the court observed, "rule 26(a)(3) contemplates that all persons who may provide opinion 
testimony based on experience or training will be identified, but that only retained or 
specially employed experts are required to also provide an expert report." Id. at f 12 
(emphasis added, citations omitted). Relying on Pete to justify a substance-based 
11 
approach to Rule 26(a)(3)(B)'s report requirement requires a strained reading of the case, 
and extra-textual interpretation of the rule. On review, however it is clear that the Utah 
Court of Appeals did not adopt a substance-based approach to Rule 26(a)(3)(B) in Pete, 
and the Utah Supreme Court should decline to do so in this case. 
II. THE SUBSTANCE-BASED APPROACH IS IMPRACTICAL IN 
APPLICATION, AND SHOULD BE REJECTED. 
A. Requiring Reports from Treating Providers Increases the Time, 
Expense, and Complexity of Litigation. 
As discussed above, the plain language of Rule 26 clearly sets forth a status-based 
approach for deciding whether an expert witness must submit a written report. In 
addition to being interpreted according to its plain language, Rule 26 should also be 
construed "so that it is in harmony with related rules." State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 UT 
49, f 15, 147 P.3d 1176. In this particular case, the Court should consider how Rule 26 
relates to Rule 1(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the rules 
should be "liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination 
of every action." 
This consideration is important, for as Justice Powell observed, rules of civil 
procedure have "not infrequently [been] exploited to the disadvantage of justice." 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). If the Court adopts 
a substance-based approach to Rule 26(a)(B)(3)'s written report requirement, it will be 
inviting such exploitation. 
The first, most obvious casualty will be the objective of securing an "inexpensive 
determination" of actions involving experts. The consequence of requiring treating 
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physicians and other non-retained experts to prepare and submit written reports is that 
injured parties, many of whom are already burdened with medical bills, unemployment, 
and other economic strains, will be forced to bear the expense. As skilled professionals, 
health care providers will require payment for the time it takes to write and review the 
reports. The added cost for a physician's time and will raise expenses exponentially. 
Furthermore, this additional expense will be virtually unavoidable because the 
plain language of the rule gives no guidance for a substance-based approach. Thus, 
plaintiffs will be forced to run the risk of speculating on how a trial court might qualify 
the substance of a treating doctor's testimony, or be forced to incur the expense and 
inconvenience of obtaining written reports as a prophylactic measure in all cases. 
The next casualty is "speedy" determination. From a practical standpoint, the 
substance-based approach ensures that litigants will file flurries of additional pleadings 
concerning the scope and substance of a non-retained expert's testimony. There will be 
motions to strike speculatively insufficient designations, and when those have been 
resolved, there will be preemptive motions to preclude or limit testimony accordingly. 
In deciding these motions, courts will be forced to take preliminary evidence and 
consider what a non-retained expert's testimony might include, whether it was formed at 
the time of the witness' direct involvement, and whether it crosses some arbitrary line 
between direct observation and indirect experience. As an inherently unworkable test, 
the substance-based approach would therefore inject additional controversy into complex 
cases, all at the expense of judicial economy and efficiency. It would therefore 
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undermine, rather than promote, the procedural objective of "securing] the just, speedy, 
and inexpensive determination of every action." Utah R. Civ. P. 1(a). 
On the other hand, adherence to the status-based approach set forth by the plain 
language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B) simply requires the parties to consider whether the witness 
has been specially retained or if his or her employment regularly requires giving expert 
testimony. A status-based inquiry resolves the issue with a minimum amount of 
controversy, and eliminates the need for superfluous motion practice and the additional 
inquiries necessitated by a substance-based determination. 
Rule 1(a) is also concerned with the "just" disposition of cases. There are obvious 
policy interests that might seem to weigh in favor of extending the report requirement to 
treating doctors. For instance, one of Rule 26's objectives is 'to simplify discovery and 
promote fiill disclosure of information." Utah R. Civ. P. 26 Advisory Committee Note 
(1999). Of course, "[o]ne of the primary goals of the discovery process is 'to remove 
elements of surprise or trickery so the parties and court can determine the facts and 
resolve the issues as directly, fairly, and expeditiously as possible.'" Glacier Land Co., 
LLC v. Claudia Klawe & Associates, LLC, 2006 UT App 516, f 35, 154 PJd 852 
(quoting Ellis v. Gilbert, 19 Utah 2d 189, 429 P.2d 39, 40 (1967)). 
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out, however, discovery policies that promote the 
"just" determination of civil actions can be served without rewriting Rule 26 by judicial 
fiat. In Watson v. United States, 485 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2007), the court discounted the 
argument that not having a report from a non-retained expert disadvantaged the other 
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side. It noted that under a plain language application of the status-based approach, 
"sandbagging is not necessarily inevitable," id. at 1108, and explained: 
Generally all witnesses, regardless of their status, must be identified, with 
their contact information, in a party's Rule 26(a)(1)(A) disclosures. 
Moreover, parties must also disclose, inter alia, a copy or location of "all 
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in 
possession, custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party may 
use to support its claims or defenses, unless solely for impeachment" Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(B) Likewise, all witnesses are subject to deposition, 
individual document demands, and other discovery the court deems 
necessary and appropriate. 
Id. 
Legitimate discovery that promotes the "just" determination of civil cases can 
therefore be served without the substance-based approach. Additionally, adoption of 
such an approach will invariably add expense and complexity to an already expensive, 
overburdened civil justice process. The status-based approach is therefore not only 
consistent with the plain language of Rule 26(a)(3)(B), but it is also harmonious with the 
policies set forth by Rule 1(a). Accordingly, the Court should construe the rule according 
to its plain language, and adhere to the status-based approach by holding that reports are 
not required for experts who have not been "specially retained" or whose employment 
does not "regularly involve giving expert testimony." 
B. Many Utah Doctors have been Directed to Refuse Contact with 
Plaintiffs' Lawyers, thus making it Impossible for Represented 
Plaintiffs to Obtain Written Reports. 
As discussed above, the Court should be mindful of the obstacles imposed by 
adding additional expense and delay. The Court can avoid these obstacles by simply 
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adhering to the status-based approach to Rule 26(a)(B)(3), which is helpful, because 
plaintiffs in Utah are already at a disadvantage when it comes to communicating with 
their physicians. 
The American Medical Association ("AMA") recognizes that treating physicians 
may be called upon to participate in the civil justice system. Article 9.07 of the AMA's 
Code of Ethics states, in pertinent part: 
In various legal and administrative proceedings, medical evidence is critical. 
As citizens and as professionals with specialized knowledge and experience, 
physicians have an obligation to assist in the administration of justice. 
When a legal claim pertains to a patient the physician has treated, the 
physician must hold the patient's medical interests paramount, including the 
confidentiality of the patient's health information, unless the physician is 
authorized or legally compelled to disclose the information. 
Physicians who serve as fact witnesses must deliver honest testimony. This 
requires that they engage in continuous self-examination to ensure that their 
testimony represents the facts of the case. 
(2004).7 Notwithstanding this ethical "obligation to assist in the administration of 
justice," the Utah Medical Insurance Association has explicitly instructed Utah doctors to 
refuse contact with plaintiffs' lawyers. 
As this Court has previously recognized, "[b]y the end of 1983, the Utah Medical 
Insurance Association (UMIA), which is owned by Utah physicians," became "Utah's 
primary malpractice carrier." Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 587 n. 24 (Utah 1993). 
Though precise numbers are unavailable, UAJ believes UMIA to represent approximately 
eighty percent of the state's physicians. Its influence is therefore substantial. Recently, 
7
 Available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/medical-
ethics/code-medical-ethics/opinion907.shtml (last accessed June 13, 2009). 
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in a publication directed to Utah physicians, UMIA advised that "[t]he best policy is for a 
physician to avoid making statements to a plaintiffs attorney regarding the care and 
management of a patient except in a formal meeting with representation from UMIA or 
other counsel." Tom Greene, A. Thomas Williams, M.D., Negotiating the Slippery Slope 
of Talking with Attorneys About a Patient's Care, (The Exchange, a Publication of the 
Utah Medical Insurance Association, Summer 2008)8 at 5. 
UMIA went so far as to warn Utah doctors, "it is not unusual for a plaintiffs 
attorney to be solicitous when gathering information, and adversarial and aggressive 
when it comes down to giving testimony." Id. The article also gives pointed directions 
to physicians, including "[d]o not provide any specific information or opinion about the 
patient or the care rendered [to the plaintiffs attorney]." Id. at 2. 
Unfortunately, many Utah physicians seem to have heeded UMIA's directive than 
Article 9.07 of the AMA's Code of Ethics, and refuse contact with plaintiffs' lawyers. 
This makes it impossible for patients' legal representatives to discuss care and treatment, 
much less solicit the writing of an expert report. This does more than simply present a 
minor practical impediment to litigation. Rather, the campaign of UMIA and other health 
care administrators who seek to prevent doctors from talking with plaintiffs' lawyers 
constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to imposing the written report requirement upon 
treating physicians. This is yet another reason the Court should adhere to the status-
based approach, and reject the substance-based approach, to Rule 26(a)(B)(3). 
8
 Attached hereto as Addendum 1. Also available at http://www.umia.com/ 
PDFs/EXCHANGE_SpringSummer2008.pdf, last accessed June 13, 2009 
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C. Adopting the "Substance-based" Test for the Treating Physician 
in this Case would Needlessly Complicate the Rule's Application 
to Other Areas of Specialized Knowledge. 
The question in this case is whether treating physicians who have been designated 
as experts under Rule 26(a)(3)(A) must also submit written reports under Rule 
26(a)(3)(B), at least in some circumstances. Proponents of the substance-based approach 
argue that it is a simple consideration of whether the doctors' opinions were formed in 
the scope of the doctor's observation and treatment of the patient. The Court must 
recognize, however, that Rule 26(a)(3)(B) applies to all expert witnesses, and not just 
health care providers. This begs the question: Even if a "scope of observation and 
treatment" inquiry would work with treating physicians, what considerations should be 
applied for different types of experts? 
The substance-based, "scope of observation and treatment" test simply does not 
lend itself to other areas of expertise. Consider the facts of State v. Rothlisberger, 2006 
UT 49, 147 P.3d 1176. As in Pete v. Youngblood, Rothlisberger addressed the issue of 
fact witnesses who possessed specialized skill, training or knowledge, and therefore had 
to be designated as experts pursuant to Utah R. Evid. 702. In Rothlisberger, however, it 
was a police officer, not a physician, who attempted to offer specialized testimony. The 
defendant objected, arguing that such testimony constituted undisclosed expert testimony 
Id. at 15. This Court agreed, holding that under Rule 26(a)(3)(A), the officer should 
have been designated as a Rule 702 expert. Id. at f 37. 
Like Pete, Rothlisberger did not address the written report requirement. 
Nevertheless, it provides a useful example. Under a substance-based approach to Rule 
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26(a)(B)(3), what considerations would apply to a police officer with specialized 
knowledge of the significance of drug volume? Although such officers may be said to 
"observe/9 they generally do not "treat;" thus, the proposed "scope of observation and 
treatment" analysis is of no use. 
The same concern would apply in a case involving the technical expertise of the 
patent holder in Adams v. Gateway, Inc., 2006 WL 644848 (D. Utah 2006). Any 
arbitrary line drawn to determine the scope of a treating physician's observation and 
treatment would not assist a court in determining whether the patent holder's technical 
expertise required him to prepare a written report. For that matter, what about 
accountants, engineers, lawyers, physicists, or anyone who may be both a percipient fact 
witness and possess "[scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge?" 
Surely the Appellant does not contend that Rule 26(a)(B)(3) should apply one way 
for medical experts, and another way for all other areas of expertise. Adopting the 
substance-based approach for a general requires that some extra-textual test be devised to 
uniformly apply to all possible areas of expertise. The federal courts that have attempted 
to fashion such an approach have met with no success, and the jurisprudence has suffered 
for it. Imposing the substance-based test on physicians in this case would establish 
precedent requiring lower courts to attempt to adapt the "scope of observation and 
treatment" analysis for every conceivable area of expertise to determine whether the 
"substance" somehow requires them to submit a written report. The resulting 
controversies would be counterproductive and inefficient. 
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In contrast, simply following the status-based approach set forth by the rule's plain 
language requires only a single, straightforward inquiry: Was the expert "retained or 
specially employed to provide expert testimony in the case," or do his or her "duties as an 
employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony?" If so, then a written 
report is required. If not, then no report is necessary. By adhering to the status-based 
approach, the Court not only upholds the general rule of plain language interpretation, but 
provides functional direction for all cases involving questions under Rule 26(a)(3)(B). 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should construe Rule 26(a)(B)(3) by its plain language, and adhere to 
the rule's status-based test. If a treating physician has not been retained for the purpose 
of litigation, then no written expert report should be required. This approach is based not 
only on a plain language analysis, but also on strong policy and recognition of the 
practical impediments created by the alternative, substance-based approach. 
Dated this 15th day of June, 2009. 
JSOCIATION FO$ JUSTICE 
RYAN M. SPRINGER 
Attorney fo\ 
for Justice 
Amicus Curiae Utah Association 
\ 
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Negotiating the Slippery Slope of Talking with 
Attorneys About a Patient's Care Tf;m Cntnt UMIA Senior Claims Investigator 
A Thomas Williams MD 
Assistant Medical Director UMIA 
AT SOME POINT DURING A PHYSICIAN'S PRACTICE, there is a 
high probability that he or she will be engaged by a plaintiff's 
attorney to discuss the care of a patient either as a potential 
expert or as a subsequent treating physician These conversa-
tions—always a slippery slope for well-intentioned and ethical 
physicians—just became more treacherous due to the February 
ruling by the Utah Supreme Court (Sorensen v Barbuto, 2008 
UT,Feb 1,2008) 
In Sorensen v Barbuto the Court ruled that a plaintiff's 
physician (treating or subsequent treating M D s) may not 
engage in any discussions with defense counsel without prior 
notification being given to the plaintiff In this case, the plain-
tiff filed a negligence action against a vehicle driver for dam-
ages sustained in an accident During discovery, the plaintiff's 
physician participated in an ex parte (one-sided, no plaintiff 
counsel present) communication with defense counsel As a 
lesult, he agreed to act as an expert witness for the defense 
Following trial for the negligence action, the plaintiff filed 
various claims against the physician for the ex parte com-
munication The physician filed a motion to dismiss the suit, 
which the Court of Appeals granted The Utah Supreme Court 
reversed the ruling judging that even when a patient puts his/ 
her medical condition at issue in litigation, the patient can still 
prevent the physician from communicating with defense coun-
sel unless specific permission is granted or representation is 
present The Supreme Court seems to believe that private, one-
sided (ex parte) conversations with a defense attorney de'pnve 
the plaintiff of a just opportunity to secure potential support-
ive witnesses and experts from among treating physicians if the 
plaintiff is not represented or a party to the conversations 
What does this mean for 
UMIA-insured physicians? 
If you are approached by a lawyer to discuss your role in 
a patient's care, the following steps are the recommended 
method of engaging the inquiring attorney 
1 Identify who the attorney represents, plaintiff or 
defense, and get the attorney's name and phone 
number 
2 Do not provide any specific information or opinion 
about the patient or the care rendered 
3 Indicate any further communication can be gladly 
accomplished once you make arrangements for 
counsel to be present 
4 Notify a UMIA claims investigator by phone of the 
tequest to meet the attorney An investigator is always 
available 
5 Resist any temptation or the seduction of a casual 
request by an attorney to discuss care or opinions over 
the phone or in person without appropriate legal 
representation 
6 Understand that even if a patient has authorized his/ 
her attorney to speak with you ex-parte, you are not 
compelled to do so without your own attorney present 
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What happens next? 
UMIA claims investigators will arrange, at no expense to the 
physician, for expert legal representation to be present for any 
required communications with the requesting attorney. To be in 
compliance with the above ruling, the plaintiff needs to be noti-
fied if the meeting is requested by defense counsel. If a meeting is 
planned with the plaintiff's attorney, it is important that the dis-
cussion be well documented to avoid embarrassing contradictions 
in testimony that can occur with informal, friendly conservations. 
What happens if you talk to lawyers about a 
patient's care without counsel present? 
Several unfortunate and embarrassing events can occur if a physi-
cian opts to engage in conversations with an attorney about a 
patient without appropriate legal support. First, you can be in 
violation of the above ruling, which could result in a secondary 
claim against you by the involved patient (plaintiff). Second, any 
information collected at an informal and casual meeting with 
a plaintiff's lawyer could result in your becoming an additional 
named physician in the suit. Third, it is possible any conversation 
you have could be taped by an attorney without your knowledge. 
Any statements you make may be used to contradict subsequent 
testimony and invalidate you as a witness to the detriment of you 
and any defendants. 
The Bottom Line 
The following examples of physician interactions with attorneys 
point out the common pitfalls awaiting the unwary physician. 
Examples 
Here are two real examples o f the kinds o f 
problems physicians created for themselves 
by talking to plaintiff 's counsel without 
proper representation and knowledge o f 
the potential pitfalls. (Names and details 
have been changed to protect the privacy 
o f the involved parties). 
Example 1: The Experience of Dr. A and His 
Recorded Conversation 
Dr. A acted as subsequent treating physician for a 
patient who filed a liability claim against a UMIA insured 
physician. The UMIA attorney scheduled the deposition 
of Dr. A to obtain his opinion about the cause and the 
permanency of the damage to the patient. No negli-
gence claim existed against Dr. A. 
One week prior to the deposition, the plaintiff's 
attorney met with Dr. A at his office to "run a few things 
by him" before the scheduled deposition. The plaintiff's 
attorney nicely and congenially asked Dr. A to comment 
on the issues discussed in a report from an out-of-state 
expert for the plaintiff, which he did. 
At the scheduled deposition requested by the defen-
dant physician's attorney, Dr. A provided testimony that 
proved to be very supportive and helpful to the defen-
dant physician on causation and long-term prognosis. 
When the plaintiff's attorney began questioning Dr. A, 
he revealed for the first time he had spoken to Dr. A the 
week before. He then proceeded to question Dr. A in 
a very accusatory way suggesting that he agreed with 
the plaintiff's expert report in their meeting just a week 
before. He emphasized Dr. A's testimony with quotes 
from his written notes made during the earlier conversa-
tion. As one might imagine, Dr. A clearly experienced sig-
nificant discomfort and embarrassment as the plaintiff's 
attorney used Dr. A's words to refute his own testimony. 
The context of the questions ended up being very dif-
ferent during the deposition than in the earlier informal 
discussion with the plaintiff's attorney when he seemed 
to only be seeking clarification. Defense counsel could 
not re-establish Dr. A's credibility and Dr. A went from 
being helpful to the defense to a discredited witness for 
both sides because of conflicting statements that were 
now permanently recorded in deposition record. 
Dr. A did not inform anyone of his meeting with the 
plaintiff's attorney, including the institutional risk man-
ager. Had he mentioned his planned meeting with the 
plaintiff's attorney to a risk manager or to UMIA staff, 
he would have been advised that it might not be in his 
best interest to discuss the case informally as anything 
said could be used against him in his formal deposition. 
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Examples... continued from p.3 
Example 2: The Friendly Neighborhood 
Attorney 
Dr. J, a pathologist and UMIA insured, examined an 
intra-operative, fragmented, frozen section during 
the course of routine work and determined it to be 
free of malignant change. A subsequent review of the 
permanent tissue sections, and confirmation by a 
gynecologic pathologist, revealed a very rare form of 
cancer. The final pathology report reflected the 
nature o f the malignancy and its likely size as 
indicated by measurement of the fragmented sample 
aggregate. The report did not indicate a volume 
estimate because of the fragmented and limited 
nature o f the specimen. 
The patient asserted a negligence claim against 
the operating surgeon for failure to pre-operatively 
anticipate the presence of the malignant tumor 
based on the pathologic report of the estimated 
tumor size. The claim did not include the patholo-
gist. 
The plaintiff's attorney knew the pathologist 
socially from the neighborhood, and Dr. J considered 
this attorney to be a friend. The attorney 
approached Dr. J and inquired about whether he had 
any slides from the case from which he could 
estimate the quantitative size of the tumor in 
centimeters. The pathology report indicated the 
mass approximated 10 cm. Dr. J indicated he could 
not put a determinate measurement on the sample 
because of fragmentation, but agreed it likely 
approached a 5 cm size. 
Several months later, the pathologist received a 
subpoena to give his deposition in the claim. The 
plaintiff's attorney again phoned the pathologist to 
review what he would say in the deposition, and for 
the first time, informed Dr. J he had taped their prior 
phone conversation. 
Concerned, Dr. J contacted UMIA for assistance 
and indicated he may have made some statements 
during his first conversation with the attorney that 
he might not be able to support during a deposition. 
UMIA retained counsel to attend the deposition with 
Dr. J, and counsel wisely demanded, and received, a 
copy of the transcript of the taped phone conversa-
tion prior to the deposition. Needless to say, the 
relationship between the attorney and the patholo-
gist cooled significantly because the attorney did not 
inform him he recorded the call until two days prior 
to the deposition. 
At deposition, the relationship between Dr. J 
and the plaintiff's attorney remained tense and 
adversarial. The plaintiff's attorney tried to hold Dr. 
J to his statements from the taped transcript even 
though they would likely not be admissible in court 
and were objected to on the record. Dr. J confirmed 
that the measurements noted in the report repre-
sented the combined diameter of the entire tissue 
sample and not the measurement o f the cancerous 
tissue. He tried to explain this point in the initial 
phone conversation, but it had been overlooked in 
the plaintiff's interpretation of his comments. The 
transcript showed Dr. J to be very distracted during 
the call as one of his children had been involved in 
an accident, and he had to deal with that issue in the 
middle of the conversation about the tumor with the 
attorney. 
Dr. J. clearly believed the plaintiff's attorney 
used his personal relationship with him to try to 
elicit statements that did not accurately reflect the 
facts of the case. Fortunately, the duplicitous action 
of the plaintiff's attorney to elicit favorable, but inac-
curate statements from Dr. J was thwarted by the 
support and guidance of UMIA counsel. Dr. J's 
statements during the deposition remained consis-
tent with the phone transcript in spite of the plaintiff 
attorney's attempt at misinterpretation. 
Negotiating the Slippery Slope... 
continued from p. 3 
The best policy is for a physician to avoid making 
statements to a plaintiff's attorney regarding the 
care and management of a patient except in a formal 
meeting with representation from UMIA or other 
counsel and only after careful, complete review of the 
records. Plaintiff's attorneys may record anything you 
say without revealing they are doing so, particularly in 
Anythingyou say in these 
casual conversations may 
make it very difficult 
to give proper, accurate 
testimony at deposition; 
the information could be 
used against you should an 
error or lapse on your part 
be discovered. 
phone conversations. Anything you say in these casual 
conversations may make it very difficult to give proper, 
accurate testimony at deposition; the information 
could be used against you should an error or lapse on 
your part be discovered. Conversations with defense 
attorneys without plaintiff approval may result in 
secondary action against the physician. 
Although generalizations are to be avoided, it is 
not unusual for a plaintiff's attorney to be solicitous 
when gathering information, and adversarial and 
aggressive when it comes down to giving testimony. 
Be especially wary of casual "friends" who are attor-
neys that just want a "curbside opinion," or want to 
"run something by you" regarding a specific patient or 
medical condition. It is best to follow the above recom-
mendations for any conversations with attorneys that 
are not your own. d 
If you have questions about the Sorenson ruling or how to 
deal with providing information to inquiring attorneys, please 
contact Jen James at the UMIA at 801.531.0375. 
From The President and CEO 
Martin J. Oslowsh 
President and CEO, UMIA 
Software Conversion Successful 
2007 was our first full year of operation utilizing the Delphi Tech-
nology Oasis Software. The 2008 renewals were processed with 
the new software. As with any data conversion, problems plagued 
us throughout the year, and in several instances, data conversion 
errors affected the accuracy of some renewals. These errors are being 
addressed and corrected as they are discovered. If you have been 
affected by any of these problems, we appreciate your understand-
ing and patience. We have always prided ourselves on outstanding 
customer service, which we pledge to continue to provide to you, our 
policyholders. 
This spring, several advancements enhanced our information 
technology capabilities, which allow us to continue to improve our 
service. These improvements included a software upgrade to the 
Oasis system and the addition of several new, faster, and bigger 
servers. Because of our increasing IT demands, the IT department 
was reorganized. In the near future, we will also be implementing a 
Disaster Recovery Strategy. 
Our plan to go "paperless" was accelerated in conjunction with 
the move to the new office location and the conversion of our soft-
ware. Since spring 2007, three million images have been scanned into 
the system including all claim files and underwriting files. We are 
now operating in a "paperless environment." As documents arrive in 
the office, they are prepped and then scanned into Imageright, our 
document management sofware. Email communications contain- , 
ing important information are copied directly into Imageright. The 
benefits of this conversion include the elimination of rental costs for 
storage of paper files and immediate electronic access to underwrit-
ing and claim information via computer terminals. Multiple people 
can view a document at the same time. The system incorporates pro-
tection from accidental deletion and loss of data. Once a document 
is scanned it cannot be deleted or altered. 
We need your email address! 
In order to complete our conversion to a paperless enterprise, we 
need your email address! It is the desire of the UMIA to communi-
cate with policyholders about Exchange operations, elections, and 
other matters via electronic newsletter. Not only will electronic com-
munication save operational costs, time, and resources, it also allows 
us to provide you with information in real time. For these reasons, 
please complete the postage-paid card contained in this newsletter 
and return it to UMIA. Future Exchange newsletters, notices, and 
risk management information will be sent electronically via email. 
If you wish to receive this information via hard copy, please let us 
know. Your email address will be kept strictly confidential, d 
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